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This study discusses navigability concepts, 
consumptive rights to surface and ground waters, the 
disposal of diffused surface waters and the admini-
stration of Kentucky's statutory water allocation 
system. 
Federal regulatory powers are based on navi-
gability as is state ownership of submerged lands. 
Kentucky uses the ebb-and-flow test of navigability 
to determine title to submerged lands but uses a 
navigability-in-fact test to determine the scope of 
state regulatory authority. Consumptive uses of 
water in Kentucky are governed by the riparian land-
owner to use as much water as he needs as long as 
his use does not interfere with the legitimate uses 
of other riparians. Underground streams are subject 
to the same consumptive use rules, but an overlying 
landowner can use as much percolating ground water 
as he needs even though other users are harmed. 
Kentucky follows the civil law rule with respect to 
the disposal of diffused surface water, but recent 
cases seem to have applied the more modern reason-
able use rule. 
ii 
In addition to these common-law rules, the 
Department for Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection, under the provisions of KRS Chapter 151, 
administers a permit system under which both ri-
parian and nonriparian users are allowed to make 
beneficial uses of water. The permit system, how-
ever, is not particularly comprehensive, and is 
subject to various criticisms. 
Descriptors: 
Legal Aspects*, Legislation, Water Law*, Water 
Policy, Water Resources Development 
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INTRODUCTION 
Drastically increased demands upon the nation's 
water resources may develop in the coming years 
because of population growth, increased per capita 
use of water, and the progressive concentration 
of population in urban areas. 1 
The population of the United States has grown 
from 76 million in 1900 to 204 million in 1970, 
and projections indicate that this trend is likely 
t t . 2 o con inue. 
Per capita use of water is also rising. Be-
cause of industrialization, per capita use of water 
in America increased from 526 to 1893 gallons 
daily per person during the first six decades of 
this century. 3 As industrial growth continues, 
. · 11 1 . 4 per capita water use wi a so increase. 
Water problems are also created by urban con-
centration. By 1980 it is estimated that more than 
half of the population will live in urban areas 
5 
of more than 50,000 persons. This urbanization 
will put a severe strain on the nation's water re-
sources since the water-holding capacity of an area 
is reduced when rural lands are converted into 
high-density residential uses. 
1 
At the present time, Kentucky's water resources 
are substantial. Kentucky has 544 square miles of 
mountain streams, rivers, lakes, and reservoirs. 6 
The Commonwealth's average yearly precipitation of 
of 46 inches produces about 100 million acre-feet 
of water annually. 7 However, according to the 
Department for Natural Resources and Environmental 
Protection, water demand will increase in the fu-
ture for agriculture, industry, municipal uses, 
recreation and pollution control. 
Although natural rainfall and storage ponds 
should provide adequate water for agricultural uses, 
irrigation is continually increasing, especially 
for tobacco. Industry is the heaviest use of 
Kentucky in water, accounting for two-thirds of 
present water used, while smaller amounts are used 
for commercial purposes. Chemicals, paper and 
metals are industrial uses in Kentucky which re-
quire large amounts of water. The state's growing 
metropolitan areas, Louisville, Lexington, Coving-
ton-Newport, Ashland, Owensboro, Bowling Green and 
Paducah, will all require greater quantities of 
water, although no shortages are imminent. Large 
quantities of water are required to support wild-
life, and planning is needed to control minimum 
2 
stream flows and lake levels. Kentucky's recrea-
tional potential depends greatly upon sound water 
management. Finally, increasing amounts of stream 
water will be needed to purify polluted discharge. 
Although Kentucky's water resources are suffic-
ient to meet immediate needs, they are not unlimited, 
and competition among the state's water users may 
occur in the future. Moreover, the introduction of 
new high-water use industries such as coal gasi-
fication and liquefaction could accelerate this 
process in some areas of the state. Kentucky's 
water allocation system may eventually have to be 
s~bstantially modified in order to maximize use 
of that resource. Ideally, proposals for such 
changes should be made before a serious breakdown 
of the allocation system occurs. This study is 
intended as a preliminary step in that direction. 
Each of the five sections of this study ex-
amines a different facet of Kentucky water law, 
Section 1 deals with the rights of landowners whose 
property lies adjacent to a water course. Concepts 
of navigability as they relate to federal regula-
tory powers and the ownership of submerged lands, 
are discussed. Kentucky uses the "ebb and flow" 
test of navigability in order to determine owner-
3 
ship of submerged lands, while the "navigability-
in-fact" test is employed where the public right 
of navigation is concerned. 
Consumptive use rights in contained surface 
waters are explored in section 2. The riparian 
system prevails in most of the eastern states, 
while most of the western states subscribe to the 
prior appropriation system. Riparian jurisdictions 
generally follow the reasonable use rule, but some 
utilize the older natural flow doctrine. Under the 
natural flow doctrine, the riparian owner, except 
for domestic purposes, may not cause the flow of 
the watercourse to diminish appreciably, The 
reasonable use rule, which Kentucky follows allows 
the riparian owner to utilize as much water as he 
needs as long as it does not interfere with the 
rights of other users. 
Section 3 examines consumptive uses of ground 
water. Ground waters are classified as either 
underground streams or percolating ground water, 
Consumptive use rights in underground streams 
are the same as those of contained surface waters. 
However, there are four positions associated with 
the use of percolating ground water: the absolute 
ownership doctrine, the reasonable use rule, the 
4 
correlative rights doctrine, and the prior appro-
priation system. 
The absolute ownership doctrine permits the 
landowner to extract an unlimited amount of water 
for use on overlying or distant lands regardless 
of injury to other users. The reasonable use 
rule limits a landowner's use to beneficial purposes 
on overlying land even though it interferes with 
the uses of others. The correlative rights doctrine 
restricts the use of water to overlying lands and 
also requires that it be reasonable in relation to 
the needs of other users. Finally, in some west-
ern states the prior appropriation doctrine is 
applied to ground water. Under this approach, the 
first landowner who puts the water to beneficial use 
has priority over subsequent appropriators during 
periods of shortage. 
Diffused surface water is discussed in section 
4. A landowner normally has a right to impound 
and use any diffused surface water on his property. 
There are three doctrines, however, that relate to 
the disposal of such waters: the common enemy rule, 
the civil law rule and the reasonable use rule. 
According to the common enemy rule the landowner 
may take any action to prevent diffused surface 
5 
water from coming upon his property, while under 
the civil law rule the upper owner has an easement 
upon the lower owner's property for the water to 
drain in its natural manner. The reasonable use 
rule provides for liability due to interference 
with the natural flow of diffused surface waters 
if the defendant's is deemed to be unreasonable or 
negligent, Kentucky once followed the civil law, 
but now seems to adhere to the reasonable use 
rule. 
Section 5 is concerned with Kentucky's water 
regulatory legislation. Under the provisions of 
KRS chapter 151, the Division of Water Resources, 
operating within the Department for Natural Re-
sources and Environmental Protection, deals with 
water use problems in the state. Consumptive 
uses of water are regulated by a permit system. 
Parties who wish to withdraw, divert or transfer 
water must obtain a permit from the Division, but 
many water users are exempted from this require-
ment. The right granted under the permit is 
specific in terms of quantity and rate of diversion. 
Nonriparians can apply for permits, and the transfer 
of water from one watershed to another is permitted. 
Water rights under the permit are granted for an 
6 
indefinite period, but the agency may make temp-
orary allocations during periods of shortage. 
7 
1. NAVIGABLE WATERS 
(a) Property Rights in Navigable Waters 
Landowners whose property borders on a nav-
igable watercourse commonly possess riparian 
rights. 9 These include a right to make consumptive 
use of the water as well as a right of access10 
to the water. Riparian landowners also share with 
other members of the public the right to navigate,11 
f · h 12 d . b th ' d. . bl is, an swim or a e in a Jacent naviga e 
13 
waters, subject, however, to reasonable regulation 
by the government in the exercise of its police 
14 power. 
Riparian property is also subject to the doc-
trines of accretion, reliction, avulsion, and ero-
sion.15 Accretion adds to the land by the gradual 
deposit by water of sand, s'ediment or other ma-
teriai.16 Reliction occurs when submerged land is 
exposed by the imperceptible recession of the wat-
17 
er. Erosion is the gradual and imperceptible 
wearing away of land bordering on a body of water 
by the natural action of the elements. 18 Avulsion 
is either the sudden and perceptible alteration of 
the shoreline by action of the water, or a sudden 
change of the bed or course of a stream forming 
8 
a boundary whereby it abandons its old bed for a 
19 
new one. 
As a general rule, where the shoreline is grad-
ually and imperceptibly altered by accretion, relic-
tion or erosion, the riparian owner's boundary 
line also shifts in the same direction. The 
landowner thus acquires title to all additions 
arising by accretions or reliction, and loses soil 
that is worn or washed away by erosion. 20 However, 
any change in the shoreline that takes place 
suddenly and perceptibly does not result in a change 
f b d h . 21 o oun ary or owners ip, 
Although a landowner may not intentionally in-
crease his estate through accretions or reliction 
b "f' . l 22 y arti icia means, he may acquire additions 
resulting from artificial conditions created by 
23 third persons without his consent. 
(bl Ownership of Submerged Lands 
(i) The Public Trust Doctrine 
In addition to other rights, riparian 
landowners sometimes possess rights in the 
streambed itself. Rights to these submerged 
lands, however, often depend upon whether 
the watercourse is navigable or not. While 
9 
the beds under nonnavigable waters are subject to 
. t h' 24 priva e owners ip, those under navigable 
waters are usually held in trust by the state 
for the corrunon use and benefit of its citi-
25 
zens. 
This rule is derived from the English 
corrunon law. The common law in England dis-
tinguished between the proprietary interests 
of the sovereign and the rights of the public 
in tidal waters. The former was known as 
jus privatum while the latter was called 
. bl. 26 JUS pu icum. Although the King could 
convey his private interest in the soil, he 
could not thereby impair the public's right 
t . t' 27 o naviga ion. Unlike the jus privatum, 
the public right to navigation extended to 
navigable fresh watercourses, as well as 
tidal waters, even where the beds were priv-
28 
ately owned. Thus, in England, ownership 
of the submerged bed was not an inevitable 
consequence of navigability. 
On the other hand, in America, the pro-
tection of public rights in navigable waters 
was associated with ownership of submerged 
29 lands. This concept, known as the public 
10 
trust doctrine may be traced in a series of fed-
eral cases beginning with Martin v. Wadde11, 30 
decided in 1842. The plaintiff in that case 
claimed an exclusive right of fishery through 
a grant from the colonial propreitor. The 
Court declared that the dominion and property 
in the tidal waters were an aspect of the 
proprietor's governmental powers and could 
not be conveyed to private citizens. Accord-
ingly, the colonial grant was declared in-
valid. 
Shortly thereafter, in Pollard's Lessee 
v. Hagan, 31 the United States Supreme Court 
determined that new states must be admitted 
on an equal footing with existing states, 
and that title to tidelands in Mobile Bay vest-
ed in the state of Alabama upon its admission 
to the Union in 1819. In Shively v. Bowlby, 32 
the Court declared that prior to statehood, 
the federal government held the beds of tidal 
waters in trust for the citizens of the future 
state and could not alienate such lands in any 
way that would impair the trust. 
The fullest exposition of the public 
trust doctrine, however, appeared in Illinois 
11 
Central Railroad Company v. Illinois33 in 
1893. The Court stated that the title under 
which Illinois held the navigable waters of 
Lake Michigan was a "trust devolving upon 
the state for the public ••. which can only 
be discharged by the management and control 
of property in which the public has an in-
terest, and cannot be relinquished by a trans-
fer of property." 34 In its present form, 
therefore, the public trust doctrine consti-
tutes a substantial limitation of the power of 
states to dispose of lands under navigable 
35 
waters. The doctrine has traditionally been 
employed to protect public rights to navi-
gation, commerce and fishing, 36 and in some 
states has also been utilized to protect re-
creational interests. 37 
(ii) Navigability for Title Purposes 
Various tests of navigability have been 
used for purposes of determining ownership 
f 38 o submerged lands. Common law rights 
to submerged lands were associated with tidal 
effect. 39 Tidal waters included the foreshore 
and "arms and creeks of the sea" as far as 
the ebb and flow of the tide extended. Lands 
12 
under such waters belonged "prima facie" to the 
Crown, although they could be conveyed into 
private ownership. 40 
In America some states retained the 
"ebb and flow" test for purposes of deter-
mining ownership of submerged lands. 41 
However, beginning with Carson v. Blazer42 in 
1810, a majority of states adopted a "navi-
gability-in-fact" test. 43 This formula has 
also been utilized by the federal courts to 
determine the ownership of submerged lands. 
The federal navigability test with re-
spect to ownership of submerged lands does 
not require that the waters be navigable in 
interstate commerce, intrastate navigability 
. . ff. . 44 l.S SU l.Cl.ent. It is immaterial that the 
watercourse is not presently used for commerce 
or that it has not been used for many years, 
so long as it was used or was susceptible of 
commercial use at the time that the state was 
admitted to the Union. 45 United States v. 
Holt State Bank46 which involved a dispute 
over the title to the bed of Mud Lake in 
northern Minnesota, is the leading case. The 
federal government asserted that Mud Lake was 
13 
not navigable under state law and had remained 
in federal ownership. The defendants maintained 
that the lake in its natural condition was navi-
gable, that the state had acquired ownership of 
the bed upon admission to the Union. The 
Supreme Court found the lake to be navigable 
but indicated that navigability, when asserted 
as the basis of a right arising under· the 
Federal Constitution, was a question of fed-
eral law. 47 
(iii) Ownership of Submerged Lands in Kentucky 
Kentucky adheres to the ancient "ebb and 
flow" test of navigability for purposes of 
determining the ownership of submerged beds. 48 
Since no watercourse in Kentucky is subject 
to the influence of the tides, in theory all 
submerged lands are privately owned. 49 
Presumably the federal test of navigability 
set forth in Holt State Bank would not apply 
to Kentucky since the state was not created 
out of federal public domain land and was 
never subject to federal ownership. 
As a general rule, the title of land-
owners along nonnavigable streams extends to 
the thread of the stream, 50 and the amount of 
14 
submerged land owned is dependent upon the 
51 frontage possessed by the landowner. Un-
til recently, however, this principle was 
uncertain in Kentucky. The Court in Berry v. 
52 Snyder held that riparian ownership extended 
to the middle thread of the main channel, 
rather than to the center of the stream itself, 
and subsequent decisions on this issue were 
ld . 53 se om consistent. Finally in Louisville 
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Ralston, 54 the Court 
held that the "thread of the stream", as 
applied to the Ohio River, meant the middle 
line as measured from the State's northern 
boundary, the low water mark on the northern 
shore to the corresponding lew water mark on 
the southern shore. 
In the case of nonnavigable lakes, land-
55 
owners usually own to the center, but spec-
ial rules have evolved with respect to the 
rights of boating, swimming and fishing on the 
surface of the lake. 56 The common law position 
restricts each owner to the use of the water 
immediately over his portion of the bed and 
57 treats any intrusion as a trespass. Other 
states subscribe to the civil law or common 
15 
use approach, which allows the owner of a 
portion of the bed to use the surface of the 
entire lake for fishing, boating and swimming, 
as long as he does not unreasonably interfere 
with the rights of other proprietors. 58 
There are no cases on this issue in Kentucky. 
(cl Public Regulatory Powers Over Navigable Waters 
(i) Federal Regulatory Authority Under the 
Commerce Clause 
Federal regulatory activity over water 
resources is based primarily on the commerce 
clause of the Federal Constitution. 59 The 
Supreme Court first recognized the power of 
the federal government to regulate navigation 
and general commercial relations in 1824. 60 
Later in Gilman v, Philadelphia, 61 the Court 
stated that the power to regulate navigation 
and commerce permitted the government to keep 
the navigable waters free from obstruction 
to navigation "imposed by the states or other-
wise; to remove such obstructions when they 
exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as they 
may deem proper, against the occurrence of the 
evil and for the punishment of offenders•. 62 
Since then, both the concept of navi-
16 
gability and the scope of federal regulatory 
power have broadened considerably. In The 
Genesse Chief v. Fitzhugh, 63 the test ad-
vanced was a factual one: if the stream was 
navigable in fact, it was navigable for 
purposes of regulation under the commerce 
clause. This test was later reaffirmed by 
the Court in The Daniel Bali. 64 
The Court held that nonnavigable waters 
affected the navigable capacity of a river 
were also subject to federal regulation. 65 
Finally in United States v. Appalachian 
66 Power Co., the Court declared that a 
watercourse that was nonnavigable in its 
natural state would be considered navigable 
for purposes of Federal commerce clause 
jurisdiction if it could be made navigable 
by means of reasonable improvements. 
The federal test of navigability for 
commerce clause purposes now covers any 
stream, river or lake that affords a channel 
for useful commerce, whether navigable in 
its natural state or not, or whether, as a 
result of reasonable improvement, it could 
be made so. In the event the water in question 
17 
fits this definition, the federal government 
has authority to undertake necessary regu-
lations to protect its federal interest in 
· t' 67 h' . ff' . naviga ion. Tis power is su icient to 
override contrary state regulations. 68 
(ii) State Regulation Powers Over Navigable 
Waters 
Although the federal government's regula-
tory authority over navigable waters is 
superior to that of the states, it is not 
exclusive. 
Although the states may exercise some 
control over nonnavigable waters within their 
borders, 69 their authority over navigable 
waters is usually much more extensive. 70 
Accordingly, the scope of the state's regu-
latory power for purposes of protecting 
public rights is usually a function of its 
test for navigability. Most states utilize 
the navigability-in-fact test for regulatory 
purposes. Under this approach, a watercourse 
is considered navigable when it is used, or is 
susceptible of being used, in its ordinary 
condition, as a highway of commerce, over which 
trade and travel can be conducted in the 
18 
customary fashion. 71 Some states, however, 
have rejected commercial use as a test of 
navigability and substituted for it a recrea-
tional or "pleasure boat" standard. 72 Other 
states have broadened their notions of commerce 
to include some recreational uses. In 
73 Luscher v. Reynolds, for example, the 
Oregon court stated that "a boat used for 
the transportationof pleasure seeking passen-
gers is, in a legal sense, as much engaged 
in commerce as is a vessel transporting a 
shipment of lumber. 074 
(iii) Regulation of Navigable Waters in 
Kentucky 
Kentucky follows the navigability-in-
fact test for purposes of determining the ex-
tent of public navigation rights in such 
75 waters. If a stream in its natural con-
ditions is capable of being used for that 
purpose, the public has an easement of navi-
t . . "t 76 ga 1.on 1.n 1.. Thus, a watercourse suscept-
ible at certain periods of the year to valuable 
use for the purpose of floating logs to market 
77 is deemed to that extent, a navigable stream. 
Moreover, a navigable capacity of the stream 
19 
need not be continuous, as long as its 
periods of high water and navigable capacity 
continue a sufficient length of time to 
k ' f 1 h' h 78 ma e it use u as a ig way. 
20 
2, CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS IN SURFACE 
WATERCOURSES 
(a) Riparian Rights 
Consumptive rights to contained surface waters 
are governed by two major allocation systems, 
riparianism and prior appropriation. The doctrine 
of prior appropriation prevails in the western 
79 
states. Under this system beneficial use of 
water, not land ownership, is the source of the 
right, and priority of use is the basis of alloc-
ation among appropriators in periods of shortage, 80 
The water use is not confined to riparian land, and 
with a few exceptions, the water can be used any-
where it is needed. Finally, an appropriation is 
always stated in terms of the right to take a 
definite quantity of water. 
Riparian rights, on the other hand, arise from 
ownership of land that borders on a watercourse. 81 
Under this regime, water may only be used on ripar-
ian land. 82 The riparian character of a tract of 
land may be determined according to the source of 
title test, under which riparian rights extend 
only to the smallest tract held under one title 
in a chain of title leading to the present owner. 83 
21 
A more liberal approach is the unity of title test, 
under which riparian rights extend to all contig-
1 d d b . . . 84 uous an owne ya riparian proprietor. In 
addition, some courts have held that only that 
portion of a tract'which lies within the same 
watershed can be considered as riparian. 85 
Limitations on the use of water to riparian 
land have not, however, been strictly observed 
in many jurisdictions. Thus, it is often recognized 
that a riparian may grant to another person, 
whether a riparian or not, all or part of the ri-
86 parian's right to the use of the water, But 
while the grantee of this right may be able to 
enforce it as against his riparian granter, he is 
unable to assert it successfully against other 
riparians who may interfere with his use of the 
water, or whose uses or rights may be interfered 
. h b h" 87 wit y is use. 
(i) The Natural Flow Doctrine 
There are two forms of riparianism, the 
natural flow doctrine and the reasonable use 
rule, At the present time only four states 
1 fl d . 88 h' l adhere to the natura ow octrine, w i e 
the remaining riparian jurisdictions utilize 
22 
the reasonable use rule. Under the natural 
flow doctrine, each riparian proprietor on a 
watercourse is entitled to have the stream 
flow through his land in its natural condition, 
undiminished and unpolluted by others. 89 
Water uses are classified as natural 
or artificial. A natural or domestic use of 
water arises out of the necessities of the 
riparian land, including household uses, drink-
ing water, and watering of a reasonable number 
of domestic animals. The domestic use is a 
favored one, and a riparian may use as much 
water as desired, even the entire flow of the 
90 
watercourse. However, a riparian may make 
an artificial use only where it will not harm 
other riparians by substantially affecting 
the flow of the watercourse. 91 Artificial 
uses are not directly related to the necessities 
of life on riparian land. Examples of arti-
ficial uses include business and trade uses, 
irrigation, mining operations, generation of 
power, and watering of large herds of stock. 
(ii) The Reasonable Use Rule 
The reasonable use theory is based on the 
23 
rationale that natural watercourses exist 
primarily for the use and benefit of mankind, 
not merely to be maintained in their natural 
state. This theory emphasizes the right to 
use water, as opposed to the natural flow 
idea of having a stream flow in a particular 
way. Under the reasonable use theory, each 
riparian is entitled to use the water for any 
beneficial purpose, on the condition that his 
use is reasonable and does not unreasonably 
interfere with a neighboring riparian's right. 92 
Thus, riparian rights under the reasonable use 
rule are correlative: no one riparian land-
owner can use more than use share of the water. 
Existing users must adjust their consumption of 
water to accommodate new riparian users, and 
riparian users must all reduce their water use 
during periods of water shortage. 
A similar concept applies to water qual-
ity. Riparians have a limited right vis a vis 
other riparians to discharge pollutants into a 
watercourse. However, such conduct will be 
deemed unreasonable and can be enjoined if it 
b . 11 . . th · · g3 su stantia y inJures ano er riparian user. 
The distinction between natural and arti-
24 
ficial uses discussed above in connection with 
the natural flow theory, however, also applies 
to the reasonable use rule, and domestic uses 
are always superior to artificial uses such as 
. . . 94 1.rr1.gat1.on. 
(bl Riparian Rights in Kentucky 
Although Kentucky is clearly a riparian state, 
for many years it was unclear whether it followed 
the natural flow doctrine or the reasonable use 
rule. In many cases the Court of Appeals treated 
the two doctrines as if they were equivalent to each 
other. Anderson v. Cincinnati Southern Railway, 95 
the first case to discuss riparian rights in Ken-
tucky, is illustrative of this confusion. The 
plaintiff in the Anderson case owned a grist mill 
on a small creek. Two miles above the mill the 
defendant railroad company constructed a small 
dam to supply a reservoir of water for its trains. 
The dam however, interferred with the plaintiff's 
mill. 
The Court declared that "[t]he right of every 
riparian owner to the enjoyment of a stream of 
running water in its natural state in flow, quan-
tity, and quality is now well established. 96 This 
language indicates that the Court was adopting the 
25 
natural flow theory. Later portions of the opin-
ion, however, were suggestive of the reasonable use 
rule: 97 
The owner is entitled to the reasonable 
use of the water for natural and domestic 
purposes; but when he undertakes to di-
vert the course of the stream, or detain 
the water by means of a dam, so as to 
prevent the previous supply to other 
riparian owners, he became a wrong-
doer • • • The use and detention of 
the water on a large stream by means of 
of a dam, for purposes of the railroad, 
might not be an unreasonable use, as 
ordinarily there would be ample water left 
for all the purposes of the riparian own-
ers below; yet, where the stream is small, 
or even large, if the dam so obstructs the 
water as to diminish the flow and lessen 
the capacity of the water power below, 
it is an injury to the proprietor for 
which damages may be awarded. 
In the end the Court reversed the lower Court's 
decision for the plaintiff and remanded the case for 
a new trial. The Court stated that no recovery could 
be had by the plaintiff unless the use of the water 
by the defendant caused his material injury - a 
question of fact for the jury to determine. 
Many of the Kentucky cases involved impair-
ment of water quality rather 
sumptive uses. In Kraver· v. 
than strictly con-
Smith,98 a distillery 
was polluting a stream by discharging waste therein. 
The court granted an injunction to a lower riparian 
on the theory that the riparian was" ••• entitled 
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to the natural flow of the water, unimpaired in 
quality, except as may be occasioned by reason-
able use of the stream by other proprietors." 99 
Pollution, therefore, is not a reasonable use under 
this standard. 
Later, in Fackler v. Cincinnati N.O. & T.R.C. 
Co., 1° 0 the court declared " •• [a] proprietor 
is entitled to have the water of a stream flow 
to his land in its natural course undiminished in 
101 quantity and unimpaired in quality." 
102 City of Louisville v. Tway, however, was 
less clear. In this case, the defendant dammed 
a stream, thereby reducing the velocity of its flow. 
The reduced flow resulted in a pollution problem 
for the plaintiff. The court stated that: 
It is true, as suggested by counsel 
for appellant, that our court is com-
mitted to the "natural flow rule" though 
as we read the two rules (reasonable use) 
••• the distinction is rather close, and 
even under what may be termed the more 
restricted theory (natural flow), .•• 
each riparian owner is recognized as 
having a privilege to use the water to 
supply his natural wants, and extraordi-
nary or artificial uses, so that such does 
not sensibly or materially affect the 
quantity of the water and such uses by the 
lower riparian owner.103 
The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed 
to show that the defendants had made "unreasonable 
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use of the water from the stream", It also de-
clared, however, that the defendants' darn "did not 
appreciably affect the flow of water" in the stream. 
The Court upheld the lower court's refusal to grant 
injunctive relief since the defendant's actions 
had not caused any demonstrated harm to the plain-
tiff's property. 
This continuing uncertainty between the natural 
flow and reasonable use theories led in 1954 to a 
legislative adoption of the reasonable use rule: 104 
The owner of land continguous to 
public water shall have the right to such 
reasonable use of this water for other 
than domestic purposes as will not deny 
the use of such water to other owners for 
domestic purposes or impair existing 
uses of other owners heretofor established, 
or unreasonably interfere with a bene-
ficial use by other owners. 
The Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted a gen-
eral formulation of the rule in Daugherty v. City 
of Lexington. 105 In this case the city of Lexing-
ton denied a building permit to the plaintiff who 
had plans to build a restaurant, because he failed 
to show that his septic tank system would not en-
danger the purity of city water in a nearby city 
reservoir. The plaintiff argued that his proposed 
restaurant would be a reasonable use of his land. 
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The court quoted from a Michigan case, Fe·ople v. 
Hulbert, 106 which set forth a reasonable use form-
ula for water: 107 
•• in determining whether a use is 
reasonable we must consider what the use 
if for, its extent, duration, necessity, 
and its application; the nature and size 
of the stream, and the several uses 
to which it is put; the extent of the 
injury to the one propietor and of the 
benefit to the other; and all other 
facts which may bear upon the reasonable-
ness of the use. 
According to the Court, the determination of reason-
able use is a question of fact to which a balancing 
test must be applied. The necessity of the use of 
water must be considered and balanced against the 
harm which would ensue from the use. 
Thus it seems that Kentucky firmly adheres 
to the reasonable use rule insofar as common-law 
riparian rights are concerned. This appears to 
be a sound choice. Despite its limitations, 
the reasonable use rule is a more efficient and 
realistic approach to water allocation than the 
obsolete natural flow doctrine. 
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3. CONSUMPTIVE RIGHTS TO GROUND WATER 
(a~ Consumptive Use Rules 
There are two legal categories of ground 
water, underground streams and percolating waters, 
and a distinct set of legal rules is associated 
"th h 108 wi eac • Underground streams flow in fixed 
or definite channels109 and are governed by the 
110 
same rules that apply to surface watercourses. 
Percolating waters are subsurface waters which, 
without any permanent or definite channel, ooze, 
seep or filter through the soil beneath the sur-
111 face. Ground water is presumed to be percolating 
unless it is affirmatively shown that the water is 
112 flowing in an underground stream. 
There are four doctrines that deal with the 
allocation of percolating ground water: (1) the 
English or absolute ownership doctrine; (2) the 
American or reasonable use rule; (3) the correlat-
ive rights doctrine; and (4) the prior appropriation 
system. 
The English or absolute ownership rule was first 
ennunciated in Acton v. Blundell113 in 1842. Under 
this doctrine, the landowner may extract an un-
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limited amount of percolating ground water from 
his land and use it on either overlying or dis-
tant lands, regardless of injury to adjacent 
landowners. 114 The rule is normally interpreted 
to hold a user liable only for waste or formal-
. . . . t h. . hb 115 d . icious inJury o is neig or an in some 
jurisdictions even these are permitted. 116 The 
absolute ownership doctrine has been criticized 
because it fails to take into account the nature 
of ground water and because it favors munici-
palities and other large users who are able to 
drill deep wells, even though they often cut off 
the supply of water from the shallow wells of 
117 
others. 
The American or reasonable use rule limits a 
landowner's use of ground water to beneficial 
purposes having a reasonable relationship to the 
use of overlying land, 118 but without regard to 
adverse effects on adjacent landowners. Use of 
the water on nonoverlying lands, however, is 
unreasonable and actionable if it injures the 
1 f d . . . l d 119 ground water supp yo an a Joining an owner. 
Even though the use is wasteful or the water is 
used on nonoverlying lands, the plaintiff must show 
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an injury or a threatened injury to his ground 
t 1 · d t · · . 120 wa er supp yin or er o maintain an action. 
Under the correlative rights doctrine, or 
California rule, each owner over a common pool 
has an equal and correlative right to make a 
beneficial use of the water on his overlying 
1 d 121 an. The use of the water must be reasonable 
in relation to the rights and needs of neighbor-
ing landowners. Priority of use is unimportant 
since in time of shortage the common supply is 
apportioned among the overlying owners on the basis 
of their reasonable needs. 122 The correlative 
rights doctrine, in fact, is similar to the doc-
trine of reasonable use that applies to contained 
surface waters and underground streams. 
Finally, some western states apply their prior 
appropriation system to percolating ground water, 
This rule gives priority to the landowner who 
first puts the ground water to beneficial use, 
Thus, the first landowner to take the water will 
123 be the last to be cut off in time of shortages. 
Scientific understanding of the relationship 
between surface and ground waters has emphasized 
the defects of the common law classification 
32 
system - a system which has received much criti-
cism from both hydrolci.gists and legal comment-
ators, 124 
Any water pumped from wells under equ-
librium conditions is necessarily di-
verted into the acquifer from somewhere 
else, but not necessarily, from places 
where it was of no use to anyone. There 
are enough examples of streamflow de-
pletion by pollution from wastes re-
leased by surface waters, to attest to 
the close though veriable relation be-
tween surface water and ground water. 
(b) Consumptive Use Rules in Kentucky 
Kentucky has long recognized the legal 
distinction between underground streams and per-
colating ground water. 125 In Nourse v. Andrews, 
a plaintiff owning land on the Muddy River in Logan 
County tried to stop the city of Russellville from 
using two springs for its water supply since this 
caused the river to be depleted, The plaintiff 
argued that the springs were part of the source of 
the river, but lost the case because he was unable 
to prove this allegation. The court stated that 
one who alleges the existence of an underground 
stream has the burden of proof on that issue. The 
126 
court added that: 
Subterranean streams, as distinguished 
from subterranean percolations, are 
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governed by the same rules, following 
surface streams, , , , The owner of 
the land under which a stream flows 
can, therefore, maintain an action 
for the diversion of it, if such di-
version took place under the same cir-
cumstances as would have enabled him to 
recover, if the stream had been wholly 
above ground, 
Therefore, according to the Nourse case, a 
landowner may assert riparian rights to underground 
water if he can prove the existence of an under-
ground stream. In Commonwealth v, Sebastian, 127 
such proof was established by pointing to a line 
of green grass which flourished in spite of dry 
weather. The Court in Sebastian also stated that 
"there is an initial presumption that subterranean 
waters are percolating, but once a subterranean 
stream is shown to exist, there arises a presumption 
that it has a fixed and definite course and chan-
1 " 128 ne , 
In the case of percolating ground water, Ken-
tucky originally followed the absolute ownership 
rule, In Kinnard v, Standard Oil Co., 129 the 
court stated that percolating waters "belong to 
the soil, constitute part of it, and may be used, 
controlled, or removed by the owner in the same 
manner that he could the soil through which the 
34 
120 
water percolates or runs". In Long v. Louisville 
131 & Nashville Railway Co., the court declared that 
"The rule is universal that the owner may dig on his 
own land such wells as he needs, although in doing 
so he may dig up his neighbor's well. u 132 
This doctrine was reaffirmed in Nourse v. 
Andrews: 133 
Percolating waters are part of the earth 
itself, as much as the soil and stones, 
with the same absolute right of use and 
appropriation by the owner of the land 
•.•. The law seems to be well set-
tled that water percolating through the 
soil is not, and cannot be, distinguished 
from the soil itself. The owner of the 
soil is entitled to the waters percolating 
through it, and such water is not sub-
ject to the appropriation. 
The absolute ownership rule, however, was replaced 
by the American rule of reasonable use in Sycamore 
134 Coal v. Stanley. In this action, plaintiff 
brought suit because the defendant coal company's 
core hole (used to test for coal) caused the water 
in his well to disappear. The defendant plugged 
the hole, but the water rose only 14 inches, as 
compared to the previous 54-inch level. The 
court found no evidence to establish the existence 
of an underground stream, and, therefore, assumed 
the waters to be percolating. The plaintiff 
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received no damages, and the Kentucky court adopt-
ed the American rule of reasonable use for future 
disputes over the use of percolating waters. 
The rule adopted in Sycamore Coal Co, limited 
the landowner over subterranean percolating waters 
to a •reasonable and beneficial use of the 
waters • • • , and he has no right to wastE them, 
whether through malice or indifference, if, by 
such waste, he injures a neighboring landowner.•135 
Since the landowner's use was "properly connected 
with the use, enjoyment and development of the 
land itself,'' the Court held that he was entitled 
to all he could use, regardless of the depletion 
of his neighbor's supply. 
Rights to the use of ground water can be 
impaired by means of contamination as well as through 
diversion or depletion. For instance, Kinnard v. 
S d 'l 136 11 d ' t tandar 01 Co. a owe a spring owner o 
recover damages from the defendant because de-
fendant's coal oil storage tanks leaked and pol-
luted plaintiff's spring, which was fed by per-
colating waters. In accord is Rogers v. Bond 
137 Brothers, where the court quoted from Cooley 
on Torts: 138 
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It is said in an early case that where 
one has filthy deposits on his premises, 
he whose dirt it is must keep it that 
it may not trespass. Therefore, if 
filthy matter from a privy or other 
place of deposit percolates through the 
soil of the adjacent premises, or breaks 
through into the neighbor's cellar, or 
finds its way into his well, this is 
a nuisance. 
However, in United Fuel Gas co. v. Sawyers, 139 
a gas company defendant was not held liable when 
a newly-drilled gas well contaminated the plaintiff's 
home water source. The Court declared that "the 
owner of land when putting it to a legitimate and 
not unreasonable use is not liable to the 01,mer 
of adjoining land for injuries to well or springs 
fed by hidden underground waters. 11140 
Although Kentucky now follows the American 
or reasonable use rule, serious consideration 
should be given to the Eastern "correlative rights" 
rule, where each landowner's right to percolating 
water "is a co-equal usufructuary right and, 
therefore, correlative, 11141 This rule would 
provide for a more uniform approach to both 
surface and ground waters. Unlike the reasonable 
use rule, the user in the correlative rights 
jurisdictions is required to compare the equities 
of conflicting uses. This is the most important 
37 
important characteristic of the rule, because 
unlike Kentucky's present rule, it does not leave 
property owners who may be dependent on per-
colating waters without any protection. 
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4. DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER 
Diffused surface waters are those waters 
resulting from falling rain or melting snow, or 
those rising to the surface in springs, which 
have not collected in a lake or pond or natural 
watercourse and are still in a diffused state or 
condition. 142 Water which overflows the bank of 
a natural watercourse and follows the course of the 
stream to its outlet, or which on subsidence re-
turns to the stream, is considered to be part of 
the watercourse from which it comes and not dif-
143 fused surface water. Likewise, water which 
overflows the banks of a lake but which remains 
connected to the lake, or flows through the nat-
ural outlet of the lake is a defined path into 
another body 
not diffused 
of water, or returns to the lake, is 
144 
surface water. However, flood 
waters which entirely lose their connection with 
a lake or stream and spread out over the adjoining 
country and settle in low places and 




Normally a landowner has an absolute right to 
any diffused surface water on his property, and he 
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may impound this water and prevent it from flow-
ing into the property of an adjoining landowner. 146 
S t t h 't' ' d th' d ' 14 7 ome commen a ors ave cri icize is octrine, 
but only New Hampshire has restricted the con-
sumptive use of such waters, 148 At the present 
time, the disposal of unwanted diffused surface 
water is more important than the regulation of 
its consumptive use, There are three positions 
on this issue: (1) the common enemy rule; (2) the 
civil law rule; and (3) the reasonable use rule. 
(al Common Enemy Rule 
Under the common enemy rule, a landowner may 
dispose of diffused surface water on his land 
regardless of injury to his neighbor. This rule 
originated in the right of a landowner to use his 
149 property as he pleases, but has been justified 
on the basis of the right to fight the "common 
enemy",lSO and on the ground that it encourages 
land improvement and cultivation. 151 The common-
enemy rule, however, has undergone some modi-
fication in the past hundred years. The modern 
common-enemy rule allows the landowner to obstruct 
or divert surface water only if the obstruction or 
diversion is related to ordinary use, improvement 
or protection of his land, and is done without 
40 
1 . l' 152 ma ice or neg igence, 
(bl Civil Law Rule 
The civil law rule is expressed by the maxim 
"aqua currit et debet currere, ut solebat es jure 
na turae, " (Water runs and should run, as it is 
wont to do, by natural right,) 153 According to 
the civil law rule, the upper owner has an ease-
ment upon the lower owner's land for diffused 
surface water to drain in its natural manner, 154 
and the lower owner may not obstruct the flow 
to the injury of the upper owner, 
The advantage of the civil law rule is that 
rights thereunder are readily predictable,but 
strictly applied, the rule may inhibit the develop-
ment and improvement of land. To avoid this dan-
ger the civil law rule has been modified in many 
jurisdictions, For example, the rule usually 
permits the upper owner to enhance the drainage 
of his property to some degree, particularly for 
agricultural purposes. 155 Moreover, the upper 
owner may normally hasten the flow of water by 
natural drainage, if he can do so in a reasonable 
manner.
156 Finally, since a strict prohibition 
against leveling or filling property wouid sub-
stantially hinder the improvement and development 
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of urban porperty, the courts frequently except 
city lots from the application of the civil law 
rule. 157 
(cl Reasonable Use Rule 
The more recently developed rule of reasonable 
use occupies the middle ground between the original 
common enemy and civil law rules and produces a 
result similar to the modified versions of each. 158 
The rule, adopted by the Restatement of Torts, 
provides that liability for invasion of a person's 
interest in the use and enjoyment of his land 
resulting from interference with the natural or 
normal flow of surface waters depends on whether 
the action, if intentional, was unreasonable, or if 
unintentional, was negligent, reckless or ultra-
159 hazardous. 
(d) Diffused Surface Water in Kentucky 
At first Kentucky applied the conventional 
"civil law" rule for diffused surface waters. This 
approach was employed in Pickerill v. Louisville, 160 
a 1907 case, in which a lower landowner raised the 
foundation of his land to avoid effects of diffused 
surface waters. This caused the upper landowner's 




• • this. • court has adopted 
in respect to such cases as this rule 
of the civil law, which only subjects 
the lower estate to the easement or 
servitude of receiving the natural 
flow of surface water from the upper 
estate , •• the owner of the lower 
ground has no right to erect embankments, 
or create other obstructions, whereby 
the natural flow of surface water from 
the upper ground is stopped or caused 
to back upon and overflow the upper 
ground. On the other hand, the owner 
of the upper ground has no right to 
make excavations, barriers, or drains 
upon his ground by which the flow of 
surface water is diverted from its 
natural channel and a new channel made 
on the lower ground, nor can he collect 
into our channel waters usually flowing 
off into his neighbor's land by several 
channels and thereby increase the flow 
upon the lower ground. 
For many years the civil law rule announced in 
Pickerill was consistently followed by the Court 
162 
of Appeals. 
163 Klutey v. Commonwealth, a 1967 case, 
marked a change in Kentucky's approach to diffused 
surface waters. Klutey involved a suit by the 
Commonwealth to enjoin property owners from main-
taining embankments on their property which were 
designed to divert the flow of water from two 
drainage pipes under a state road, The accelerated 
flow of water from the drainage pipes caused ex-
43 
tensive erosion and flooding and so the prop-
erty owners constructed embankments to protect 
their land. This, however, caused the water to 
back up on the highway. When the owners were 
ordered to remove the embankments, they argued 
that under the civil law rule the Commonwealth 
could not change the natural drainage of the 
land if such actions would accelerate the flow 
and cause damage to their property. 
The court pointed out that the "civil law" 
rule failed to consider the socially desirable 
uses of the property or the extent of damage one 
property owner might cause his neighbor. Thus, 
the court announced that Kentucky would follow 
the reasonable use rule: "In substance the rule 
balances the reasonableness of the use by the 
upper owner against the severity of damage to 
the lower owner." 164 
The court in Klutey recognized the potential 
problems in a test for reasonableness, and adopted 
the standard set forth in the Minnesota case of 
165 Enderson v. Kelehan: 
••• the rule is that in effecting a 
reasonable use of his land for a legit-
imate purpose a landowner, acting in 
44 
good faith, may drain his land of surface 
waters which would otherwise have never 
gone that way but would have remained 
on the land until they were absorbed by 
the soil or evaporated in the air if 
(al there is a reasonable necessity 
for such drainage; 
(bl reasonable care be taken to 
avoid unnecessary injury to the 
land receiving the burden; 
(cl the utility or benefit accuring 
to the land drained reasonably 
outweighs the gravity of the 
harm resulting to the land re-
ceiving the burden; and 
(dl where practicable, it is ac-
complished by reasonably im-
proved and aiding the normal 
and natural system of drainage 
according to its reasonable 
carrying capacity, or if, 
in the absence of a practicable 
natural drain, a reasonable 
and feasible artificial drain-
age system is adopted, 
Commonwealth v. Baird166 further refined 
Klutey•s reasonable use test by stating that the 
question of reasonableness of the upper owner's 
use of his land against the harm to the lower 
owner from such use is a matter for the jury, except 
in extreme cases where the liability may be deter-
mined as a matter of law, 
Cases since Klutey indicate that the 'reasonable 
use" test, as a practical matter, has not changed 
the main characteristics of the "civil law" rule, 
45 
The "reasonable use" test, as set forth in 
Klutey, is a more flexible standard which can be 
applied where necessity or utility dictates, 
46 
5. STATE REGULATION OF WATER RESOURCES 
(a) Water Resources Administration in Kentucky 
The riparian system has been criticized because 
it restricts the use of stream water to riparian owners 
and because it limits the use of the water to riparian 
170 
land. Another undesirable feature is the uncertain 
171 
nature of water rights under the riparian system; 
in many jurisdictions the extent of a riparian's right 
of reasonable use can be determined only by litiga-
172 
tion. These concerns have led to the statutory 
modification of common law riparianism in a number of 
eastern states. Under these statutes water use is 
regulated by a state administrative under some form 
173 
of permit system. 
Kentucky made the first significant legislative 
change in its riparian system in 1954. The droughts 
of the two preceding years caused many farmers to turn 
to the streams and lakes bordering their land to sat-
isfy their needs .. The increased use of riparian water 
demonstrated the need for a more satisfactory defini-
tion of riparian rights in Kentucky. With this in 
mind, the legislature set forth in the 1954 act a 
basic statement of the rights of landowners in such 
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waters. The statute also provided for the Legis-
lative Research Commission to make a thorough study 
of all problems relati~g to water resources and to 
report its findings to the 1956 legislature. 
The act applied to "public water" which included 
contained surface water and ground water, but not 
diffused surface water. Section 3 of the act set 
forth the rights of landowners to use the public 
waters of the state. The act provided that the use 
of water by a riparian owner for domestic purposes 
would have priority over other uses and declared 
that riparian owners "shall have a right to make such 
reasonable use of the water for other than domestic 
purposes as will not deny the use of such water to 
other owners for domestic purposes or impair exis-
ting uses of other owners heretofore established, or 
unreasonably interfere with a beneficial use by other 
owners". Finally, the act allowed riparians under 
certain conditions to impound and store water on their 
land as long as this would not injure the rights of 
175 
other users. 
In 1966 the •)lder act was replaced by a more 
comprehensive piece of legislation, KRS chapter 151. 
This legislation, administered by the Department for 
48 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, 
attempts to deal with the state's water resources 
on a coordinated and comprehensive basis. Consump-
tive uses of water are regulated by a permit system. 
The construction of dams and impoundments is also 
controlled by the agency. In addition, the legis-
lation authorizes water resources planning and con-
struction for flood control and water development 
purposes. 
The Division of Water Resources within the 
Department for Natural Resources and Environmental 
176 
Protection administers the act. Originally, the 
Division of Water Resources performed both adjudi-
eatery and planning functions. The first five years 
of the Division's operation concentrated on the 
gathering of data and the study of federal water 
plans. The data collected was designed to provide 
the factual basis necessary to coordinate the plan-
177 
ning for Kentucky's water. The Division's most 
important function was implementation of the state's 
water plans, and it·was empowered to issue permits 
178 
for the use of water in Kentucky. 
The 1974 General Assembly transferred some of 
the Division's regulatory powers to the Department 
49 
of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection 
179 
and the Commissioner of that agency. However, 
the Division retains the power to allocate water in 
180 
times of shortage and to issue permits for dams 
181 
within the commonwealth. 
KRS 151.330(1) created the Water Resources 
Authority of the Commonwealth. A 1974 amendment 
lists the following persons as members of the Autho-
rity: the governor, the commissioner of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Protection, the secre-
tary for finance and administration, the commissioner 
of health, the commissioner of commerce, the commis-
sioner of agriculture, the attorney general, the 
secretary of the department of transportation, the 
commission of fish and wildlife resources, and the 
commissioner of parks, none of whom are compensated 
for their duties. The Authority is "empowered to 
coordinate the programs of all state agencies in the 
conservation, development, and wise use of public 
182 
water, and to simultaneously "promote the benefi-
cial and proper distribution of water throughout the 
183 
state. Its chief function, however, is to contract 
with the federal government, primarily the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, to obtain water supply space in 
184 
existing federal projects. 
50 
The agencies mentioned in KRS 151 are only 
two of the many agencies and governmental bodies 
which affect Kentucky's water resources, The 
governor's cabinet maintains planning responsibility 
of water matters in Kentucky. 185 Pollution matters 
are under the control of the Water Pollution Control 
Commission, which is within the Department of Health. 
This commission was created in KRS Chapter 224, and 
it has a permit system whereby polluters must first 
obtain a permit before discharging waste into 
state waters. 
Agencies on a local level with responsibilities 
relating to water resources development or control 
include: (ll drainage, levee, and reclamation 
districts; 186 (2) soil and water conservation 
districts; 187 (3) watershed conservancy dis-
. 
188 C4l fl d 1 d. · d ·t· 189 tricts; oo contro istricts an ci ies; 
and (5) water districts. 190 
The Water Resources Act also deals with flood 
control and water development. Before any party 
in Kentucky can construct any dam, levee, dike, or 
other obstruction across a stream, he must submit 
plans to the Div_sion of Water Resources and 
1 f •t 191 Th 1 1· t app y or a permi • e same rue app ies o 
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any building, barrier, or other obstruction which 
will result in distrubing the flow of the 
192 
stream. 
The 1974 General Assembly established strict 
criteria for periodic, five-year safety inspect-
ions of dams, levees, or other obstructions re-
193 
stricting water flow in Kentucky. Such in-
spections emphasize safety and non-interference 
with beneficial uses of othe.r water users. Stiff 
penalties are provided for those who fail to 
comply with the standards set by the Department 
for Natural Resources and Environmental Protection. 
The Department may take full charge of the unsafe 
dam, correct the situation, and charge all costs 
to the owner of the dam. The owner's property is 
subject to a foreclosure sale if payment is not 
made. 
The pennit system for dam construction, is 
weakened by several exceptions. First, the 
Division has no control over dams or obstructions 
"which are not of such size or type as to re-
quire approval by the division in the interest of 
194 
safety or retenLion of water supply". The 
1974 General Assembly was more specific, when it 
52 
195 defined dam as: 
•• any artificial barrier, including 
appurtenant works, which does or can 
impound or divert water, and which 
either (1) is or will be twenty-five 
(25) feet or more in height from the 
natural bed of the stream or watercourse 
at the downstream toe of the barrier, 
as determined by the department, or 
(2) has or will have an impounding 
capacity at maximum water storage 
elevation of fifty (5) acre-feet or 
more. 
The primary exemption is extended to Kentucky 
farmers: 196 
Nothing in this section is intended to 
give the division any jurisdiction or 
control over the construction, recon-
struction, improvement, enlargement, 
ditch, or system established for 
agricultural purpose, or to require 
approval of the same except where such 
obstruction of the stream or floodway 
is determined by the division to be a 
detriment or hindrance to the beneficial 
use of water resources in the area •. 
Other parts of KRS 151 are concerned with the 
financing of state water projects. A special 
revolving trust fund, known as the water resources 
fund, has been established, from which the Water 
Resources Authority is authorized to make loans 
and expenditures. 147 The loans are available 
to any "country <!ity, water district, watershed 
conservancy district, or other governmental sub-
division,"198 and their interest is determined 
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199 by the Authority, and they must be secured. In 
addition, the Authority is authorized to issue 
revenue bonds for the purpose of paying all or 
part of such . 200 proJects. 
(bl Regulation of Consumptive Use·s of Water 
in Kentucky~ ~ ~~ 
KRS 151.110 states that it is the policy of the 
Cormnonwealth "to protect the rights of all persons 
equitably and reasonably interested in the use 
and availability of water." This policy is imple-
mented by a permit system under which consumptive 
water uses are regulated by the Division of Water 
Resources. KRS 151.140 provides that "No person, 
business, industry, city, county, water district, 
or other political subdivision has been granted 
a permit by the division for such withdrawal, 
diversion or transfer of water," 
Unless otherwise exempted, all parties, public 
or private, must register with the Division and 
apply for a permit to withdraw, divert, or transfer 
public water. The agency conducts an investigation 
to determine that "the quantity, time, place, or 
rate of withdraw2~. of public water will not be 
detrimental to the public interest or rights 
of other public water users." 201 
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To date about 800 permits have been granted. 
Permit holders are required to keep daily records 
of their withdrawals and submit quarterly reports 
to the agency. The Division is also empowered to 
inspect withdrawal records to determine whether 
such records are correct and in proper order. KRS 
151.170 provides that the permits shall be specific 
in terms of quantity, time, and rate of diversion, 
transfer or withdrawal. Although there is no 
durational limit on their effectiveness, the per-
mits are not necessarily perpetual, nor do they 
create any rights of priority in times of water 
shortage. Instead, KRS 151.200 (ll authorizes 
the Division, with the approval of the Water Re-
sources Authority, to make temporary allocations 
of available public water among users in times 
of droughts, shortages or emergency situations. 
The Kentucky statute departs substantially 
from the riparian system by allowing nonriparian 
owners to obtain permits. KRS 151.200 (2) allows 
the transfer or diversion of water from one 
watershed to another. Moreover, no express 
restriction is placed on the transfer of water 
rights as long as the nature or location of the 
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of the diversion is not changed. 
The scope of the permit system is limited 
in several respects. The first limitation stems 
from the definition of "public waters". Diffused 
surface waters and waters "left standing in 
natural pools in a natural stream when the nat-
ural flow of the stream has ceased" are excluded 
from the definition of public water by KRS 151,120 
(2) and are thus unregulated. 
In addition, KRS 151,140 expressly exempts: 
(1) domestic users; (2) agricultural users, in-
cluding irrigators; (3) uses exempted by admin-
istrative regulation; (4) stream generating plants; 
and (5) water injected underground in connection 
with oil and gas production. 
The exemption for domestic use reflects the 
high priority given to such uses under riparian 
dictrine. Domestic uses are exempted from 
regulation in most states, KRS 151.100 (10) 
defines "domestic use" as "the use of water for 
ordinary household purposes, and drinking water 
for poultry, livestock and domestic animals." 
The exemptioP nor agricultre is more signifi-
cant. Irrigation in Kentucky in 1970 averaged 
about seven million gallons of water per day 
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203 
on 25,000 acres of land, Tobacco is the 
principal crop using irrigation waters, and if a 
drought year occurs, some 36,000 acres would 
require 4,320,000,000 gallons of water. 204 The 
exemption is due largely to the efforts of the 
Farm Bureau which views with extreme alarm any 
regulation of farm ~ctivities, Nevertheless, 
this exemption is a major weakness in the regula-
tory scheme. 
No permit is required "if the amount of water 
withdrawn, diverted or transferred is less than 
the amount established by regulation " This 
exemption was created as a result of an amendment 
in 1974 to KRS 151.140 requested by the agency. 
The agency now exempts from the permit system 
those who use less than 10,000 gallons per day. 
The 1966 act orginally exempted many manu-
facturing and industrial users from the permit 
requirements, provided that the water was re-
turned in substantially the sanequantity and 
condition as it was when withdrawn. This pro-
vision was repealed in 1972, leaving only 
stream-generatL1g facilities still exempt. 
Finally, the use of water for secondary recov-
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ery operations continues to be exempt from the 
permit requirements. 
There are a number of weaknesses in Kentucky's 
water regulatory system. For example, water re-
source development authority is fragmented among 
various state and local agencies, There is no 
clear relationship between the regulatory permit 
system and a comprehensive state water use plan. 205 
The permit system itself is subject to serious 
criticism. At the administrative level, formal 
procedures available to applicants or other in-
terested parties to contest the grant or denial 
of a permit could be made somewhat more elaborate. 
In addition, the agency should be given authority 
to settle disputes among water users. Finally, a 
process by which water can be set aside for future 
public uses such as conservation, recreation, 
water quality control or public water supply should 
be established. 
The large number of statutorily exempted users 
undermines effective use of the agency's regulatory 
power and renders the permit system useless as a 
means of effectu~ting any meaningful water use 
policy. Moreover, the permit system as it presently 
operates, does not allocate water among competing 
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users in a fair and efficient manner. This is 
largely because rights to water vis a vis other 
users are not clearly defined. 
Water rights under KRS Chapter 151 are similar 
in some respects to those in a prior appropriation 
jurisdiction. As in the West, the right to water 
under the permit system is based on priority in 
time and beneficial use. KRS 151.170 (2) provides 
that no permit shall be denied toa responsible 
applicant who is willing to put the water to a use-
ful purpose as long as water is available. The 
Kentucky statute, although it does not specifically 
adopt a "beneficial use" standard, in effect ut-
ilizes this approach since any productive use 
qualifies and no attempt is made to establish pre-
ferential use categories. The element of priority 
is important in Kentucky because existing permit 
users (and riparian users exempt from regulation) 
are protected against subsequent permit applicants. 
The agency can only grant permits where water is 
available and apparently cannot revoke a permit 
in order to make water available to another 
applicant. Thu,, as far as the initiation of a 
water use is concerned, "first in time is first 
in right." 
59 
The relationship between existing permitees 
and unregulated riparian users needs clarification. 
What happens when an unregulated riparian owner 
increases his water use, or makes a new use, and 
this interferes with a permitee? For example, if 
a farmer begins to make a withdrawal of water 
for purposes of irrigation, an unregulated use, 
is his right to the water superior to that of 
the permittee? Must both the riparian user 
and the perrnittee adjust their water use in accord-
ance with the common-law reasonable use rule or is 
the right of the riparian superior to that of the 
permittee {or vice versa)? In the hypothetical 
case discussed above, would it make any difference 
if the permittee was a nonriparian user? Conflicts 
of this nature are certain to arise eventually in 
Kentucky and will probably have to be settled by 
litigation. 
In times of water shortage, a term which is not 
defined, KRS 151.200 {1) allows the Division of 
Water Resources to suspend the operation of the 
permit system and make temporary allocations of 
water among permittees on some other basis. 
This provision raises two questions: (1) What is 
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the relationship between riparians and permittees 
during periods of water shortage? and (2) What is 
the relationship among the various permittees dur-
ing periods of water shortage? 
The relationship between riparians and permittees 
has already been discussed, Since the agency has 
no authority to regulate exempt users even during 
periods of water shortage, the courts must decide 
whether unregulated riparian users must accommodate 
permittees during such periods and if so, on what 
terms. 
The relationship between permit users is 
also left very vague under the Kentucky statute. 
Under prior appropriation the right to water 
during periods of shortage (as well as any other 
time) are based on priority in time, No attempt 
is made to pro-rate water use but instead the 
senior appropriator may take his full amount 
before a junior appropriator is entitled to any 
water at all. Although this rule is harsh at 
times it provides an element of certainty that is 
lacking under both the riparian system and Kentucky's 
statutory framew'Jrk. KRS 151.200 (1) gives neither 
the agency nor permits users any indication of the 
basis upon which water will be allocated among 
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permittees during periods of water shortage. This 
is a very serious defect in the Kentucky legislation. 
An important objective of any permit system is to 
provide a degree of certainty in the water allo-
cation process so that water users can make in-
telligent investment decisions. In Kentucky, this 
element of certainty is lacking because the water 
user cannot rely on his permit right at the very 
time he needs it most. 
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CONCLUSION 
The law of water rights in Kentucky is a complex 
and sometimes uncertain mixture of common law doc-
trine and regulatory legislation. Both the common-
law and the statutory aspects of Kentucky system of 
water allocation are in need of modification. In 
the former case, the archaic distinction between 
ground water and surface water consumptive use rules 
should be abolished. Since Kentucky now follows the 
reasonable use rule with respect to contained surface 
waters (and underground streams}, the adoption of the 
correlative rights rule with respect to percolating 
ground water would provide the Commonwealth with a 
uniform standard for all non-regulated consumptive 
uses. 
Some changes are also desirable for Kentucky's 
statutory framework. The statute's broad exemption 
provisions should be modified or eliminated, and the 
rights of water permit holders should be clarified. 
The dual system of water rights which now prevails 
between permittees and non-regulated riparians inhib-
its maximum productive use of water and promises to 
create severe administrative problems for the agency 
during periods of water shortage. 
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Finally, the state must continue, and perhaps 
increase, its water resource planning activities. 
Comprehensive planning must include both water qual-
ity and consumptive use needs, and must be coordi-
nated with federal, state and local land use policies. 
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